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Must the American Criminal Justice
System Be Impotent?*
Ernest van den Haagt
I.
Crime is morally and materially costly. It endangers the so-
cial order, affronts society and arouses fear, diminishing the
tranquility and the freedom to which citizens are entitled. Vio-
lence, so often part of crime, is harmful morally and materially,
while property crimes unjustly transfer wealth from victims to
criminals. The risk of such transfers and the cost of private and
public protection are part of the cost of crime. Although some
recent practices seem to suggest otherwise, restitution to the vic-
tim cannot offset these social costs, let alone discharge the penal
liabilities of criminals. Restitution, at most, discharges the civil
debt owed by the offender to the victim.
* This article is reprinted by the permission of The Washington Institute for Values
in Public Policy, 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Suite 910, Washington, D.C.
20036(c).
t John M. Olin Professor of Jurisprudence and Public Policy at Fordham Univer-
sity; M.A., State University of Iowa; Ph.D., New York University.
The views expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of the author.
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II.
Crime rates have long been much higher in America than in
Europe.1 Many causes have been alleged. Perhaps heterogeneity,
pluralism, federalism, liberty, or demographic factors explain
part of the difference. But learning as much is not helpful be-
cause we cannot or will not give up any of these features of our
society. Similarly, genetic, social and psychological causes of
crime such as low intelligence, broken families, or parental mis-
treatment are not likely to be greatly affected by any remedies
which society can devise. Although still favored by presidential
commissions, poverty, inequality and bad housing have also
been discredited as causes of crime.
Consider poverty. America is the world's wealthiest major
country; yet it also has one of the world's highest crime
rates - a crime rate higher in prosperity than in depression,
and which rises "with increases in median family income."'
There is inequality. However, no correlation has ever been
demonstrated between crime rates and inequality or, for that
matter, lack of public housing. Reducing inequality may be
worthwhile per se; but even if, despite differences in effort and
ability, we all received the same income - hardly a realistic
prospect - there would still be inequality because some of us
would spend our income on receipt (or even before) and others
would save a portion. Enough inequality would remain to moti-
vate robbers or burglars. Further, criminals may well victimize
persons of equal wealth or even those who have less than they
do.
Little can be done about these alleged causes of crime. They
are of but academic interest to anyone who wants to reduce
crime rather than use it as a pretext for social reform. Hence,
the sanctions of the criminal justice system are the only realistic
hope we have for controlling the crime rate.
Attempts by the criminal justice system to strengthen sanc-
tions are costly.3 They require politically difficult reforms: more
1. See, e.g., H. ZEISEL, THE LIMITS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, (PASSIM) (1982).
2. J. WILSON & R. HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE 328 (1985).
3. Prison operation costs alone (exclusive of construction costs) have been estimated
from $10,000 to $40,000 per inmate per year. D. McDONALD, THE PRICE OF PUNISHMENT:
PUBLIC SPENDING FOR CORRECTIONS IN NEW YORK 17, 55 (1980). The cost of constructing
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and better police, more prosecutors and better judges. In the
short run, more prison space may be needed too. However, in
the long run, the inmate population need not increase. If pro-
spective criminals can be deterred by punishing actual criminals
and punishing them more severely, ultimately fewer, rather than
more, prison cells will be needed. There would be fewer
criminals, although a greater proportion would be imprisoned.
Reformers who try to discourage the public from strengthening
penal sanctions by pointing to the additional prison space
needed totally disregard the deterrent effect of imprison-
ment - that is, the ultimate reduction of the crime rate.4
The cost of better crime control is likely to be less than the
cost of uncontrolled crime. However, the cost of crime is mainly
borne by victims, whereas the cost of controlling crime is borne
by the taxpayers whose representatives do not find it politically
expedient to increase appropriations for crime control. It does
not bring votes.
If the necessary money were spent, another more thorny
problem still would remain. The sanctions of the criminal justice
system are effective only if inflicted on the guilty and not on the
innocent. If innocents were as likely to be punished as guilty
persons, the threat of punishment could not lead anyone to
avoid crime. But, the attempts of the criminal justice system to
discriminate between the guilty and the innocent are not fool-
proof and allow guilty persons to go free if their guilt cannot be
proved. Yet, if the evidence required for conviction were signifi-
cantly reduced, or if essential procedural safeguards were weak-
ened to increase the proportion of offenders convicted, the risk
of convicting innocents might increase. Attempts to convict a
higher proportion of offenders also might inconvenience persons
not guilty of any offense, or curtail liberties. By searching or ar-
resting people on slight suspicion, we may well find more offend-
ers - but at a cost borne by suspected non-offenders.
a single prison cell is $30,000 to $200,000. M. SHERMAN & G. HAWKINS, IMPRISONMENT IN
AMERICA: CHOOSING THE FUTURE 2 (1981) (cost estimated to be $30,000 to $60,000); Gott-
fredson, Institutional Responses to Prison Crowding, 12 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE
259, 262 (1984) (cost of constructing an average prison cell will exceed $200,000).
4. See J. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 175-77 (1975); see also J. FINCKENAUER,
SCARED STRAIGHT! AND THE PANACEA PHENOMENON 29-44 (1982); F. ZIMRING & G. HAW-
KINS, DETERRENCE, THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL 234-41 (1973).
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Textbooks usually give four purposes of punishment:
1. Justice
2. Deterrence
3. Incapacitation
4. Rehabilitations
Deterrence most directly addresses the crime rate. Crime is
rewarding to the criminal only if its expected benefit exceeds its
expected cost by more than other activities available to him. No
cost is likely to be high enough to make crime unrewarding for
everybody. Some persons enjoy risks, or underestimate actual
costs. A few may even commit crimes for the pleasure of it, re-
gardless of costs. Still, the cost which can be imposed on the
criminals can suffice to make crime unrewarding for most people
most of the time. The threat of punishment is the major disin-
centive available.
To help control high crime rates, the criminal justice system
can increase the probability of punishment, the severity, or both.
Probability is much costlier to increase than severity. It is easier
to sentence criminals more severely than to catch and convict
more of them. But, it should not matter whether we increase
probability or severity. For a "career criminal" who commits nu-
merous offenses every year, it does not matter materially
whether, over a period of five years, he serves two years once
(low probability, high severity) or one year twice (high
probability, low severity). Either way, over five years, he serves
two years in prison. However, there may be some differences in
the psychological impact: the delayed punishment may be per-
ceived as less probable. Furthermore, most offenders concentrate
on the short term.
Criminal opportunities obviously strike the eye of the career
criminal. However, most people ignore them because they be-
5. I shall disregard "special deterrence" (intimidation) of the person actually pun-
ished, since it does not differ from rehabilitation: either is meant to achieve the non-
recidivism of the person punished, albeit by a different method. When speaking of deter-
rence, I shall henceforth mean deterrence of others than the person punished.
6. See, e.g., S. KADISH, S. SCHULHOFER & M. PAULSON, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
PROCESSES 187-210 (1983). For more analysis of the purposes, see F. CULLEN & K. GIL-
BERT, REAFFIRMING REHABILITATION (1982) (rehabilitation); J. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT
CRIME 173-74 (1975) (incapacitation); F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE, THE LEGAL
THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL 234-41 (1973). See generally J. WILSON & R. HERRNSTEIN,
supra note 2, at 492-98.
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lieve that "crime does not pay." They have internalized the
moral restraints which form their law-abiding habits. In the
words of James Fitzjames Stephen, "Some men, probably, ab-
stain from murder because they fear that if they committed
murder they would be hanged. [They fear that murder does not
pay.] Hundreds of thousands abstain from murder because they
regard it with horror. [They abstain because of moral restraints.]
One great reason why they regard murder with horror is that
murderers are hanged. [The threat of punishment generates
moral restraints which are internalized and form law-abiding
habits.] ."7
Sir James' formulation explains why the criminal justice
system mainly deals with two relatively small and marginal
groups: those who did not sufficiently internalize most moral re-
straints and are committed to criminal careers, and those with
almost normal moral restraints who are tempted by exceptional
opportunities or needs. Once habitually committed to crime,
criminals can seldom be deterred by feasible threats. The legal
threat of punishment is important because it deters most people
from becoming, rather than from being, criminals. The actual
punishment of criminals is indispensable; first, to make the
threats of the law credible and, second, to serve as a further
threat to prospective offenders.
III.
Textbooks often give the erroneous impression that the
crime rate depends on the psychological causes dwelled upon.
However, these causes determine only who is capable of commit-
ting crimes. They do not determine the crime rate. Far more
people are capable of committing crimes than actually
do - just as far more people are capable of becoming dentists
or delicatessen clerks than actually do. The important question
is: why do no fewer and no more of the available individuals ac-
tually become dentists, delicatessen clerks, or criminals? What
determines the rate of these activities at any given time?
The rate of crime depends on the comparative net benefit
expected, as does, mutatis mutandis, the rate of dentistry or of
7. H. GROss, A THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTIE at 489 (1979).
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delicatessen clerking. The net benefit equals the market value of
the proceeds of crime, less the costs imposed on the criminal by
the courts, that is, the risk of punishment which equals the
threatened punishment divided by the probability of suffering it.
The threatened punishment itself, which must be discounted by
the improbability of suffering it, is only the legal list-price of
crime.
While the gross benefit to the criminal in property crimes
depends on the market price of the proceeds, the gross benefit of
non-property crimes may be independent of any market. This is
the case for rape, for the unlawful taking of money and, indeed,
whenever the proceeds are directly consumed by the perpetra-
tor. Many crimes are mixed. The rapist may rob the victim and
take her money as well as her watch. Whatever the combination,
an increase in the costs imposed by the courts will lead to a re-
duced net benefit for the criminal and, therefore, to less crime.
There may well be a point of diminishing returns for such cost
increases; there is no evidence to indicate we have reached it.
Factors other than threatened punishments may affect the
expected comparative net advantage of crime. By making legiti-
mate opportunities available or by increasing the benefits they
yield, the comparative net advantage of crime can be reduced.
Unfortunately, all attempts to do this have come to naught.'
In theory, one can increase the cost of crime by increasing
moral restraints, by strengthening education or religion; in prac-
tice, the criminal sanction is indispensable. To illustrate, if we
want to reduce littering, education and numerous strategically
placed waste containers will help. However, neither will avail un-
less punishment is available as well. The punitive threat alone
could accomplish the purpose although in less than optimal
fashion. Education and the containers alone could not.
IV.
By trying to get what they want by illegal means, criminals
act quite rationally if they can expect a comparative net advan-
tage. It is society that acts irrationally by allowing crime to be
profitable, yet objecting to it. Yet we are told ad nauseam by
8. See W. LUKSETICH & M. WHITE, CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY 117-42 (1982).
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sociologists and psychologists that criminals are neither rational
nor calculating and that, therefore, threats of punishment will
not deter them; or, we are told that criminals do not expect to
be caught, wherefore threats are idle.
The first part of both these propositions is irrelevant and
the second untrue. Criminals indeed do not expect to be caught;
if they did, they would not commit crimes. But, they are aware
of the risk of being caught and are accordingly affected by the
probability and severity of threatened punishments.
As we all do, criminals behave as though calculating. Calcu-
lation is embodied in our habits, though not necessarily in our
awareness. When we choose cheap or expensive restaurants or
shops, we do not engage in elaborate calculations each time. We
have evolved an habitual life style based on what is available
and profitable for us. So have criminals. Although not calculat-
ing, criminals, as do all sentient beings, respond to incentives
and disincentives. Rationality is not needed for such responses
which are equally characteristic of law-abiding citizens,
criminals and rats. Calculations are needed only for predicting
the responses of others.
To be sure, the same incentives or disincentives have differ-
ent impacts on different individuals or on the same individuals
in different situations. A disincentive sufficient for habitually
law-abiding citizens does not suffice to deter habitual criminals.
Disincentives strong enough to deter most people most of the
time still do not suffice to deter all people all of the time. How-
ever, legal disincentives should suffice to deter from criminal
conduct most young males. They are most often tempted. Yet,
our sanctions have conspicuously failed to deter as many as
could be deterred.'
V.
The discussion thus far has been concerned with deterrence
without referring to justice. However, justice is indispensable to
9. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS; CRIME IN THE
UNITED STATES 161 (1984) (published annually). See J. FINCKENAUER, supra note 4 at 29-
67 (1982); J. WILSON. THINKING ABOUT CRIME 206-07 (1975); P. HAHN, THE JUVENILE OF-
FENDER AND THE LAW 3-4 (2d ed. 1978); M. HASKILL & L. YABLONSKY, CRIME AND DELIN-
QUENCY 366-67 (3d ed. 1978).
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deterrence. Deterrence rests on discriminating between the
guilty and the innocent, that is, on doing justice. If we
threatened and punished not only the guilty but the innocent as
well, we could not hope to deter prospective criminals for they
would run no greater risk than noncriminals. Further, justice de-
mands that the gravest crimes, those that harm and offend us
the most, be punished most severely. So does deterrence: we
want to deter the gravest crimes more than others and hence
must threaten the harshest punishments for them.
Unlike justice and deterrence, rehabilitation and incapacita-
tion are irrelevant to the crime rate, except when the pool of
prospective criminals is limited. Only in this exceptional case do
fewer remain as more become incapacitated, or are willing to
give up crime because of rehabilitation. Usually, however, the
pool of potential criminals is no more limited than the pool of
potential dentists, farmers, or delicatessen clerks. Not that ev-
eryone is a potential everything. One may need dispositions and
abilities such as physical stamina or manual dexterity to become
a criminal or a dentist. However, the number of potential den-
tists, farmers, delicatessen clerks, or criminals so much exceeds
the number of active ones that incapacitation or rehabilitation
can scarcely make a difference. Those who have been deacti-
vated are readily replaced unless the expected comparative net
advantage does decline enough to dissuade new recruits. The
only practical way of dissuading new recruits is to increase the
cost of crime to them, thereby reducing their net advantage.
Thus the only practical means of increasing deterrence is to in-
crease effective legal sanctions.
VI.
In the United States only a small proportion - less than
three percent - of all those arrested for a felony are punished
by imprisonment.1" Even in the best of circumstances, only a
small percentage of all crimes is ever punished - so small that
the activities of any criminal justice system mainly serve to stig-
matize crime and vindicate the social order symbolically. None-
theless, the criminal justice system is effective: most people
10. J. WILSON & R. HERRNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 425.
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avoid committing crimes. Perhaps sanctions and lotteries are ef-
fective for the same reason. Many people buy lottery tickets al-
though the chances of winning are infinitesimal, far smaller than
the chances of being punished for a crime. People irrationally
hope to win in spite of low probability. Analogously, people may
avoid crimes because of irrational fears of losing, in spite of low
probability. Their anxieties about violating the laws lead most
people to overestimate their chances of being caught and pun-
ished. Crime, we have all learned, will be followed by punish-
ment. Anxieties are commingled with realistic fears. Even a
three percent rate of punishment means taking a chance greater
than appeals to most people most of the time. However, that
chance is taken quite often by those who make crime their trade.
Currently, the chance of severe punishment is not great enough
to discourage as many as we wish. A five percent chance, which
is quite feasible, may well halve the crime rate.
Withdrawal of the immunity in practice now granted
juveniles,1 would by itself reduce the crime rate. The available
data about juvenile crime and punishment do not permit a full
analysis. However, in 1933, with forty-six percent of the popula-
tion under age twenty-five, thirty-nine percent of all those ar-
rested were less than twenty-five years old. In 1980, though com-
prising only forty-one percent of the population, fifty-six percent
of all those arrested were under twenty-five. Other data confirm
that there is currently more juvenile crime relative to adult
crime than in the past. 2 The explanation is quite simple. Since
1933 we have effectively given immunity to juveniles, a practice
which ought to be stopped. Those charged with crime should be
tried in adult courts and exposed to the same sanctions as
adults. Insufficient competence should be presumed as a matter
of law only when the suspect is less than twelve years of age. If
incompetence is claimed by defendants over twelve years of age,
it should be decided on by the courts in each case according to
the evidence.
11. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 6.05, 4.10 (1974); N.Y. CEIM. PROC. LAW §§ 720.10,
720.20 (Consol. 1984); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.02 (Consol. 1975).
12. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 9, at 167; see also J. WILSON,
supra note 9, at 206; Avi-itzhak & Shinnar, Quantitative Models in Crime Control, 1 J.
CRIM. JUST. 185, 196-97 (1973); Wellford, Age Composition and the Increase in Recorded
Crime, 11 CRIMINOLOGY 61 (1973).
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Crime rates declined in the United States during the nine-
teenth century and indeed up to the 1960's. However, between
1960 and 1975, there was a rapid rise - 232%. Homicide rates
increased to 10.2 per 100,000 by 1974, from 4.7 per 100,000 in
1961. Burglaries tripled in ten years; robberies more than trip-
led. Despite this rapid rise in crime, the number of persons in
prison declined from 118 per 100,000 to 70 per 100,000. While
crime rates rose, imprisonment rates declined. Indeed the
probability that a felony "would result in imprisonment de-
creased fivefold."' 3 It takes no great acumen to conclude that
crime rose because the risk of imprisonment declined. The judi-
ciary, in charge of applying sanctions, became reluctant to con-
vict and imprison. Just as punishment can control crime,
nonpunishment can decontrol it. This is what happened in the
1960's. Criminals were spared and victims suffered. They still
do. This seems as good an argument for mandatory and determi-
nate sanctions and for reform of judicial procedures as can be
imagined.
Judicial policies alone did not cause the rise of the crime
rate in the 1960's. There was an increased number of young
males in the crime-prone ages and other contributory factors
during this prosperous period. But the added young males ac-
counted for less than half of the rise in property crimes and no
more than ten percent of the rise in violent crime.' 4 Clearly,
crime rose rapidly between 1960 and 1980 because the severity
and frequency of punishment declined. The cost of crime to the
criminal was reduced by decreasing the severity and frequency
of sanctions. Wherefore, the net benefit of crime to the criminal
rose.
VII.
Regardless of what TV viewers are led to believe, seasoned
lawyers admit that most individuals charged with crime are
guilty. Nearly ninety percent avoid trial by pleading guilty to
lesser crimes than those charged.15 Prosecutors accept such pleas
because trials are hazardous, cumbersome and time-consuming.
13. J. WILSON & R. HERRNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 425.
14. Id. at 140-43.
15. L. WEINREB, DENIAL OF JUSTICE 71 (1977).
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Though some unwieldiness and hazards are unavoidable, much
of the problem is caused by time-honored, though otherwise un-
justifiable judicial practices.
The purpose of a trial is to determine whether a defendant
who has pleaded not guilty is, in fact, guilty of any of the of-
fenses with which he has been charged. Courts can find the truth
they seek only by evaluating the evidence. Accordingly, they
need to consider all available evidence. However, our courts have
given a lower priority to the orginal purpose of a trial than they
have given to an unrelated purpose which they have added: to
discipline law enforcement agencies so as to restrain them from
unlawful acts. To pursue this added purpose, courts are willing
to defeat the original purpose of trials by not admitting availa-
ble evidence, however credible and decisive, if it was obtained by
illegal means. Yet, police are not restrained by the courts' dis-
carding evidence illegally obtained, or by the nonconviction of
guilty defendants."6
Police could be disciplined by direct means. Officers sus-
pected of unlawful acts should be prosecuted by special prosecu-
tors who, not being involved in any other prosecutions, would
not depend on the cooperativeness of the defendant officers' col-
leagues. Unlike the exclusion of evidence, such prosecutions
would not interfere with determining the guilt or innocence of
the defendants. There is no reason for not admitting all evidence
relevant to the guilt or innocence of defendants. How it is ob-
tained is irrelevant. Only its credibility matters. Nor is there any
reason for shielding juries from evidence thought to be prejudi-
cial, if it is relevant to any degree. If juries are capable of decid-
ing on guilt and innocence, they are capable of distinguishing
between what is relevant and what is merely prejudicial.
Lawyers often prevent clients from confessing guilt, except
in exchange for a reduction of charges. Under present rules, this
is their duty.' But confession not only is good for the soul for it
may lead to moral regeneration; confession also helps justice, if
16. Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Messiah and Miranda: What Is "Interrogation"?
When Does It Matter?, 67 GEo. L.J. 1, 97-98 (1978). See also Caplan, Questioning Mi-
randa, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417 (1985); van den Haag, Limiting Plea Bargaining and
Prosecutorial Discretion, 15 CUM. L. REV. 1 (1984).
17. See ABA, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Standards 3-4.1 and 3-4.2 (1980).
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not lawyers. Suspects should not be allowed to see lawyers or
anyone other than physicians during the first forty-eight hours
of detention. The availability of physicians on demand would
preclude physical mistreatment. Statements made by suspects
should always be admitted and evaluated by the court. They will
be more credible if videotaped. Miranda v. Arizona,1" the Su-
preme Court decision which excludes confessions made in the
absence of counsel unless the suspect had knowingly declined
counsel, does not serve justice, reduce crime, or protect those
unjustly suspected. As do all exclusionary rules, Miranda helps
the guilty, not the innocent, by excluding confessions and other
evidence of guilt.
Prosecutors should be duty bound to charge suspects with
all crimes for which they can find sufficient evidence. Charges
for which they have sufficient evidence should be dismissed only
with judicial permission to be granted when it serves the pur-
pose of justice. Guilty verdicts should require the assent of only
two-thirds of the jury, rather than the unanimity which makes
conviction of the guilty so difficult now. Prosecutors should be
allowed to ask the defendant pertinent questions in court, al-
though constitutionally the defendant cannot be compelled to
answer. Contrary to judicial enlargements of this protection,
courts should be expected to draw appropriate inferences from a
defendant's failure to answer. To try a defendant without being
allowed to ask about his version of events is the equivalent of
presenting Hamlet without the prince, and just about as odd.
VIII.
As penology has developed, the range of sanctions has been
reduced. We punish offenders by fines, prison, or death. Execu-
tions are now rare. In an average year, there are about 20,000
homicides, fewer than 300 death sentences and between twenty
and thirty executions. 19 Prison is often replaced by conditional,
slightly supervised liberty such as probation and parole. Only a
small part of every prison sentence is actually served in prison.
Corporal punishment may well be less severe, more effective
18. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
19. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BULLETIN No. NCJ 98399
Capital Punishment 1984.
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and less costly than incarceration. However, a reintroduction of
corporal punishment is clearly out of the question for psycholog-
ical reasons. None of our punishment is corporal, except for the
death penalty, and the death penalty has become controversial
enough to be abolished in most Western countries.
Fines are rather ineffective since laws stipulate maximum
and minimum fines without regard to inflation or the financial
resources of the offender. To accommodate these factors, fines
should always be "income-day fines": the offender should be
fined a number of days of his income as determined by the
court. Income-day fines could replace imprisonment more fre-
quently than fines currently do. Defendants who do not have
enough legitimate income to pay income-day fines, if willing to
earn the money needed rather than go to prison, should be per-
mitted to submit an appropriate plan of work and payment to
the court based on their income-earning ability.
Prison still would be needed for those unwilling to pay their
fines. Prison is indispensable as well when the crime is so grave
that no other punishment would adequately stigmatize it, or
when the offender is a danger to the community because of per-
sistent violence or other criminal conduct.
For many offenders, however, incapacitation by means other
than prison might do. The offender might be exiled to some
small out-of-the-way place where, supervised by the local police,
he could be forbidden to use any means of transportation with-
out permission. If unable to make a living, he would go on wel-
fare and the locality to which he was exiled would be reim-
bursed. In a small and remote place, it would be as impossible
for a convict to engage in muggings, burglaries, or other criminal
activities as it would be in a prison. Yet, the offender would have
more liberty, while the cost of exile would be a fraction of the
cost of imprisonment.
Exile has a long history and suffers from a bad reputation
acquired because of political use and of notorious places of exile,
such as Devil's Island. Yet, when properly used, exile is effective,
more humane and less costly than prison. So are income-day
fines.
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Ix.
Imprisonment, likely to remain the punishment for many
crimes, currently keeps most prisoners idle while failing to moti-
vate those who work. Prison pay scales are counterproductive.
Offenders who must be imprisoned fall into two classes:
those likely to try to escape, usually long-term prisoners, and
those unlikely to try. Only the former require high security pris-
ons. The latter may be discouraged from escaping by the threat
of severe punishment for actual or attempted escapes and by
their own desire not to live as fugitives. Further, convicts may be
asked to furnish bail for the duration of their sentence, as many
did before conviction, if the sentence is to be served in a non-
security prison.
Non-security prisons should be dormitories, without most of
the physical security precautions now characteristic of prisons.
Inmates should be expected to work within the prison precincts
for market-determined wages with deductions for taxes, room
and board, family support and, when ordered, restitution. How-
ever, prisoners should retain enough of their wages, perhaps no
less than a third, to give them an incentive to work. Many pris-
oners are unaccustomed to regular work, the most promising
habit they could form in prison. Prisoners who, despite the in-
centives, refuse to work in a satisfactory fashion should be main-
tained on welfare standards. Purchase of amenities and rental of
private rooms within the prison should be permitted, but only
with money earned in prison.
Prison products could be sold primarily to government and
non-profit organizations at market prices.20 Agriculture, which
offers no prospect of employment after release, should be
avoided for urban convicts.
The idea that frequent contact with family and friends
helps to rehabilitate has never been proven. Family and friends
did not prevent the offenses that led to conviction, yet prisons
are built near urban areas to accommodate them. Prisons would
be cheaper to build and run outside metropolitan areas.
20. Work is best performed in factories run by private enterprise on prison grounds.
They may be lured by appropriate enticements. Burger, Prison Industries: Turning
Warehouses into Factories With Fences, 45 PUBLIC ADM. REV. 754, 757 n.5 (1985).
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X.
At present, judges select prison sentences from within a
wide range with a minimum and a maximum fixed by law.
Judges also tend to give indeterminate sentences, for example,
from five to twenty-five years, leaving parole boards to decide
when to release prisoners who have served the minimum sen-
tence. The prison administration may further reduce sentences
by as much as half by granting "time off for good behavior."
These discretionary provisions lead to great disparities in
sentences and in actual time served by different convicts for the
same crime. Judicial and parole discretion were intended to
adapt sentences to the individual criminal and the circum-
stances of his crime and to ensure that imprisonment did not
exceed the time needed for rehabilitation. But discretion actu-
ally leads to sentences adapted to the individuality of the judge
and to parole decisions based on guesswork.
Deterrence would be served best (and justice would not be
served less) if all sanctions were mandated by law, leaving courts
with discretion over no more than ten percent of the mandated
sentence. Reduction (or increase) of the mandated sentence by
more than ten percent should be allowed only with a full judicial
explanation by the sentencing judge, with the right to appeal af-
forded to both the defense and prosecution.
Sentences should be flat as well as determinate. Parole
boards might well continue to supervise released prisoners, but
they should have no influence on the time originally served.
Knowledge of the prisoner's behavior in prison, the only knowl-
edge not available to the sentencing court, does not enable pa-
role boards to predict his behavior upon release. Anyway, the
prisoner is punished for what he did, not for what he might or
might not do. Time off for good behavior should never exceed
ten percent of the total sentence; otherwise, the sentence cannot
be a true deterrent.
Would justice be served if sentences actually could reflect
the individuality of each criminal and his circumstances? As-
sume that Smith steals $500 to clothe his needy children, Brown
to go to graduate school, and Jones to buy liquor. Is the proposi-
tion, "Theft of $500 is to be punished by X days imprisonment,
unless it be done to clothe one's children (in which case there is
a discount), or to attend graduate school (a smaller discount), or
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to get drunk (a surcharge)," more just than the proposition,
"Theft of $500 is to be punished by X days in prison?" Should
the absence of needy relatives increase punishment? Should we
leave it to each judge to decide whether devotion to alcohol
(seen as a vice or a disease) is worse than devotion to graduate
study? What weight should be given to the harm done? Should
greed be less mitigating than jealousy? Should the customari-
ness of unlawful behavior in a given environment be mitigating?
Or the unusualness? Should the poverty, wealth, or youth of the
offender or victim be a factor? What weight should these factors
have and what factors should mitigate or aggravate the crime?
Judges, not being all of one mind, will evaluate identical
factors differently. What indeed could enable any judge to un-
derstand and evaluate the unique personalities and life circum-
stances of offenders? What criteria are to be considered in deter-
mining a punishment? Can judges really take into account the
differences in heredity, environment and opportunity which pro-
duce different personalities? Can criminal justice take full ac-
count of the variety, can it correct the unfairness of life? Chari-
table attempts to do justice to individuals must end in
arbitrariness, injustice and reduced deterrence. Although crimes
can be punished only by punishing criminals, we come nearest to
justice - and to equality - by punishing criminals according
to their crimes, and, only exceptionally, according to what we
can learn about their personalities, circumstances, or motiva-
tions. Thus, sentences should depend only on culpability, previ-
ous convictions, arrests2 1 and the seriousness of the crime.
Crimes should be legally classified with determinate punish-
ments mandated without parole.
Equality does not assure justice, for equal injustice is quite
possible. However, inequality necessarily implies some injustice.
One, if not both, of two unequal sentences must be unjust and
will be perceived as unjust, if the crime was (or was perceived to
be) the same. If one punishment is just, any other must be un-
just, whether harsher or milder than deserved, less or more than
21. Prior arrests without conviction do not demonstrate guilt. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
But a person presently found guilty of an offense should have been warned by his prior
arrests. His failure to heed these warnings could legitimately be taken into account in
the mandated sentence. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 55.05, 70.10 (Consol. 1973).
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optimally deterrent. Hence, equality, reasonably felt to be part
of justice in sentencing, is often mistaken for the whole of it.
Mandated punishments, which would be equal punishments,
would strengthen the sense that justice has been done.
The law must do justice not only to offenders but also to
victims of crime. The offender does not take the life-circum-
stances of the victims into account, and society need not assume
a moral obligation to take into account the offender's life-cir-
cumstances. More important, courts must do justice to future
victims of offenders. Future victims are more entitled to protec-
tion from victimization than present offenders are to protection
from severe mandated sentences. Offenders volunteered to take
the risk of the mandated punishments. Prospective victims
never volunteered to be victimized. Because offenders volun-
teered for the risk of the mandated sentence, that sentence can-
not be unjust - though it may be wise or unwise - anymore
than an accident, suffered by someone who volunteers for a risky
enterprise such as mountain climbing, can be just or unjust.
The injustice to future victims done by attempting to do
justice to the individuality of current offenders is often over-
looked because the current offender is an identifiable individual
who is tangibly present in court and usually wretched. The vic-
tims of future offenses cannot be present; nor can they be identi-
fied. They are "statistical persons," abstract and ghostly figures
who do not invite our compassion and scarcely appeal to our
sense of justice. By nature and conditioning, we tend to be im-
pressed by identifiable persons. We try to do justice to them,
often at the expense of anonymous statistical persons. Yet, the
absence of future victims from the courtroom does not invali-
date their claim to protection.
XI.
Many aspects of our current criminal justice system cause it
to be less effective than it should be. Changes along the lines I
have suggested are in the offing but will take a long time to im-
plement. It took our courts quite some time to pull the teeth out
of our criminal justice system. Perhaps, it will take less time to
replace them.
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